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INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 3713
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 9923
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 4327
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0185
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0184
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0205
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3914
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2182
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0859
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2308
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000156

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DEPT FOR INL ANDREW BUHLER AND NORIS BALABANIAN AND SCA/CEN
BRIAN RORAFF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2018

TAGS: [SNAR](#) [ASEC](#) [EAID](#) [PREL](#) [KCRM](#) [KCOR](#) [UZ](#)

SUBJECT: DOING BUSINESS WITH UZBEKISTAN: FOLLOW UP TO THE
2007 END USE MONITORING REPORT

REF: A. SECSTATE 11320 (NOTAL)

[1](#)B. 05TASHKENT 204

[1](#)C. 07 TASHKENT 191

[1](#)D. 08 TASHKENT 113

[1](#)E. 08 TASHKENT 133

[1](#)F. 08 TASHKENT 82

Classified By: Poloff Tim Buckley for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

Per request in reftel A , the following information is
transmitted to INL as a supplement to the 2007 End Use
Monitoring Report:

Status of Jeep Cherokees

[1](#)1. (SBU) Nine Jeep Cherokees were provided to the Uzbek State
Customs Committee in August 2000. In post's 2004 End Use
Monitoring Report (reftel B, paragraph #2-C), we first
reported that "two of the vehicles are perhaps being misused"
and may have been given to other agencies. The bilateral
relationship quickly deteriorated in the wake of the 2005
Andijon events, but we subsequently confirmed in the 2006 End
Use Monitoring Report (reftel C, paragraph #2) that "two of
the vehicles are being used by the National Security Service
and General Prosecutor's Office to conduct tactical
operations." The 2006 Report further noted that Customs at
that time was unable to provide any information on the
location or condition of these vehicles.

[1](#)2. (C) In the end use monitoring visits for the 2007 cycle we
submitted a diplomatic note specifically requesting access to
the nine Jeep Cherokees originally provided to Customs. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) facilitated timely access
to the seven vehicles currently in the possession of Customs,
and Customs officials were more than happy to cooperate. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs also facilitated access to the
Jeep Cherokee currently being used by the Office of the State
Prosecutor, which allowed post to confirm the vehicle was
indeed transferred but was in excellent condition and used to
support investigative work. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
did not provide any contact information or access to the

final vehicle being used by the National Security Service and, as in previous years, we could not verify its location or condition. As discussed recently in reftel D, the National Security Service wields extraordinary clout in Uzbekistan, and it is not surprising that Customs -- which is lower in the pecking order -- had to give up a few vehicles essentially as an internal tax. Customs officials are eager to resume cooperation with the United States after a difficult time in the bilateral relationship, but they do not have the power to reassert control over these two vehicles. Post will try again in 2008 to access the remaining Jeep Cherokee which is being used by the National Security Service.

13. (C) The Jeeps were transferred in 2000; however the Letter of Agreement which serves as the basis for the modern era of INL assistance to Uzbekistan was not signed until 2001. There is no institutional memory at post about the specific conditions placed on the Government of Uzbekistan with regard to vehicle use prior to the current Letter of Agreement. The current Letter of Agreement states that other current and future INL-funded resources will not be transferred to other agencies. The previously documented transfer of the two Jeep Cherokees at some point during 2004 was clearly not in the spirit of the intended purpose of the INL equipment donation; however, in 2008 we are seeing encouraging signs of rapprochement with the Government of Uzbekistan.

Random, Surprise Inspections

14. (C) Regarding the impossibility of conducting random, surprise inspections we noted in the 2007 End Use Monitoring Report, we would like to highlight that this is simply the way business is done in Uzbekistan. Most INL-donated

equipment is located in secure law enforcement compounds, whether in the capital Tashkent or at remote border checkpoints. The Government of Uzbekistan requires official diplomatic notes for virtually all access to such facilities or meetings with appropriate personnel. Any attempts to access facilities without the advance approval of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (usually involving an "inter-agency process" that includes the National Security Service - reftel D) are denied. Even as a modest rapprochement began in the latter part of 2007 this rule was not relaxed. For example, poloff submitted a diplomatic note informing MFA about a planned visit to the Jar-Tepa border checkpoint east of Samarqand on the Tajik border in October; the request was denied by phone on the eve of travel and border guards (the Uzbek Border Guards are part of the National Security Service) turned poloff back near the checkpoint. Another poloff attempted to conduct undeclared end use monitoring of equipment in Khorezm Region in northwest Uzbekistan in November, but local authorities serving as minders on that trip kept finding reasons why this was not possible. A few days later, the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan also denied poloff's request to conduct end use monitoring there on the grounds that the Minister himself had to approve this and was unavailable.

15. (C) The restriction of access to facilities is not specifically directed to embassy officials, and diplomats from other missions report having to go through similar, cumbersome proceedings to access any sites or arrange meetings with the Government of Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan is a sensitive, deeply suspicious police state and, as asserted in reftel D, some corrupt and powerful elements may have reasons to want to restrict access to foreign diplomats. Ever mindful of these conditions, emboffs ask as many questions as possible about the equipment when we do finally get in the door. Poloff was satisfied during this round of visits -- which included visits to government facilities in Bukhara, Navoi, Termez, and Tashkent -- that local rank-and-file law enforcement officials are using INL-donated equipment for its intended purpose and taking good care of it given limited resources. In no case did we get the impression that equipment was suddenly returned or brought back "to show the

Americans" because they knew we were coming.

Maritime Operations Equipment

16. (SBU) In August 2001 equipment was provided to the then-independent Committee for State Border Protection (since reorganized within the purview of the National Security Service) in conjunction with training courses administered by U.S. SEALs. The equipment included: socks (70 pairs); boots (42 pairs); canteens (35); compasses (35); diving fins (40 pairs); flashlights (35); digital waterproof watches (35); protractors (35); personal flotation devices (35); First Aid kits (35); Garmin Etrex global positioning system (GPS) devices (10); and one cargo net. U.S. SEALs conducted a subsequent successful training program in 2002 using the equipment, and it was noted at that time that some clothing and equipment was already heavily worn or broken. Post did not conduct end use monitoring of this equipment during this cycle and all equipment is now beyond a reasonable expected lifespan.

Sensitive Investigative Unit

17. (C) INL provided funding for almost all the necessary equipment to establish the counter-narcotics-focused Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) within the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) also provided expertise and additional funding. The Government of Uzbekistan effectively suspended cooperation with the Drug Enforcement Administration in 2006, and DEA officially suspended its operations in early 2007. Recently,

the Government of Uzbekistan has hinted that it would welcome the resumption of cooperation with the Drug Enforcement Administration. Poloff recently visited the SIU to conduct end use monitoring and was able to confirm that all equipment was present and accounted for. Despite concerns the unit may have been disbanded, Poloff found the unit to be active and functioning, with one officer designated as responsible for maintaining an inventory of INL-provided equipment. The status of the SIU equipment was addressed in the 2007 End Use Monitoring Report submission (reftel E); see paragraphs 5, 7, 8, 11, 14, 18, and 19. Also, reftel F includes detailed information about the Sensitive Investigative Unit from Poloff's recent visit there to conduct end use monitoring. The INL-provided equipment at the Sensitive Investigative Unit has been put to good use and is well cared for; some unused items are still in the original packaging. The officers even continue to track some obsolete, broken cell phones so they can demonstrate full accountability.

18. (SBU) As noted in paragraph 11 of the 2007 End Use Monitoring Report (reftel E), Post conducted an inspection of all 28 vehicles provided to the Sensitive Investigative Unit in 2003. The fleet intentionally includes mixed models, including Uzbek and Russian sedans commonly seen on the streets of Uzbekistan. These local vehicles have the advantage of being easy to maintain and repair on the local market, and this undercover unit uses regular garages to help maintain their low profile. Poloff and LES checked the Vehicle Identification Numbers (VIN) of all vehicles on our inspection and verified the cars are in good condition, even after years of intensive use. There are only two Opel Astras among the fleet of 28 that are presently inoperable. The vehicles require approximately USD 2,000 of repairs that the SIU has no budgetary resources to complete. Nonetheless, the vehicles are otherwise in good condition and are kept in a secure garage until repairs can be made. Since the SIU does shift work, a portion of the vehicles were in active use on patrol or investigations during our visit, and on-duty officers quickly responded to calls from the supervisor to return to headquarters for our inspection.

Status of Miscellaneous Equipment Provided to Customs

¶9. (SBU) In 2001 INL purchased 300 vehicle search mirrors and 300 maglite flashlights for Uzbek Customs. This equipment was widely distributed to border checkpoints throughout the country. Poloff personally observed officers using one of the mirrors to search a vehicle at the Hayraton checkpoint on the border with Afghanistan during an unrelated December trip. Customs officials reported that all mirrors are still functional, and we will continue to try to observe customs searches at border checkpoints during our travels in 2008. The maglite flashlights are now on their seventh year of use and are also widely distributed throughout the country. Many are now believed to be broken after heavy use in harsh climatic conditions that range from bitter cold to extreme heat. Our records show that 7,000 drug testing kits were provided in 2006 and have also been widely distributed to border posts throughout Uzbekistan. Instructions were provided in the Russian language and training programs increased officers' skill in conducting the tests. Local authorities reported that the kits are very useful and are gradually being utilized.

Comment

¶10. (C) We would like to take this opportunity to again emphasize that INL equipment donations have been very much appreciated by rank-and-file law enforcement officials in Uzbekistan, who take pride in maintaining the equipment. During difficult times in our bilateral relationship, INL trainings, equipment donations, and end use monitoring trips provided embosffs with valuable opportunities to interact with Government of Uzbekistan officials and get a better sense of

what was happening around the country. Doing business in Uzbekistan can be challenging, as bureaucratic hassles and the murky, far-reaching influence of the National Security Service demonstrates. However, the Government of Uzbekistan increasingly welcomes and is asking for cooperation on law enforcement and border security assistance programs, and INL activities will have a prime role as we pursue multifaceted reengagement with the Uzbeks. We are satisfied that far and away our equipment is being well-maintained and is not growing feet.

NORLAND